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Abstract 
Using a laboratory experimental approach, this study examines the effect of institutional 
changes in the responsibility for paying inspection costs for environmental regulations on the 
behavior of polluters and authorities. In particular, we compare two schemes: one is that 
authorities always bear the inspection cost and the other is that polluters bear the cost in a 
given situation. We find that polluters comply with regulations more frequently in the latter 
than the former scheme, while the inspection behavior of authorities does not change 
significantly. Moreover, the cost-bearing change in the scheme induces income redistribution 
between polluters and authorities (pollutees or society). In addition, we introduce uncertainty 
about the occurrence of environmental damage, and find that the frequency of inspection is 
greater in the latter than the former scheme. Because both inspection and compliance costs 
increase, total payoff may decrease by the partial shift of responsibility for inspection cost 
from authorities to polluters. 
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1. Introduction 
In the field of economics, the effectiveness of various kinds of environmental policies, such 
as regulations and taxes, has become an area of interest. Taxes are often considered to be 
preferable, because taxes can incentivize polluters to reduce their emissions and adopt 
environmentally friendly technology. However, in the real world, regulations are enforced in 
various industries and for various pollutants. One reason that environmental authorities adopt 
direct regulations rather than incentive schemes is that the former is more immediately 
effective than the latter. Punishment schemes for violation usually accompany regulations and, 
accordingly, polluters have to comply with regulations from the date of enforcement. 
Meanwhile, when polluters pay taxes, they can keep their status-quo production technologies 
and production quantities if they want to do so. 
   One important problem with environmental regulation and punishment schemes is that 
monitoring and inspection are imperfect. It is likely that the skills and technologies for 
monitoring and inspection are imperfect. Moreover, because these activities are costly, it is 
difficult for authorities to inspect all polluters for violation of regulations. To make matters 
worse, authorities might not have incentives to inspect polluters. The intuition is that 
inspections must be carried out after production activities. At that point, pollutants have been 
already emitted into the air and/or water. Moreover, even if authorities enforce punishment, 
fines and compensation are types of income redistribution between polluters and pollutees. 
Because inspection activities incur additional costs, it is meaningless for authorities to carry 
out the inspection if the objective of the authorities is social surplus maximization. 
   Many studies have been tackling this issue. Theoretically, for example, Harrington (1998) 
examined the inspection and compliance behavior in a repeated game setting, and 
demonstrated that even if the possibility of inspection is low firms may comply with 
environmental regulations when authorities classify firms into groups based on their behavior 
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in the past. Several papers also investigated institutional issues. For example, Franckx (2002) 
examined the effect of ambient inspection when an authority cannot verify each firm’s 
pollution emission with certainty. Frieson (2003) also considered a targeting scheme that save 
inspection costs and encourage compliance behavior. Moreover, many studies considered 
optimal policies including the choice of tax, standards, or emission permits and the 
introduction of self-reporting scheme in the presence of imperfect and costly inspection 
(Xepapadeas, 1991; Chen and Liu, 2009; Evans et al., 2009; Arguedas et al, 2010; Caffera and 
Chávez, 2011).2  
Empirically, Helland (1998) examined the effect of inspection and violation in the past 
periods and economic conditions on the behavior of polluters and authorities in the present 
period. Because self-reporting schemes are also referred to, the analysis of Helland (1998) is 
closely related to this study in terms of the relationship between the past and present variables. 
Moreover, Dion (1998) examined the factors that influence the monitoring behavior of 
authorities. In terms of the function of regulations, Stafford (2003) investigated whether the 
US hazardous waste regulation works effectively. Moreover, Shimshack (2005) found that 
there is a reputational effect regarding enforcement of inspections. Several articles focused on 
punishment schemes. For example, Stafford (2002) investigated the effect of severity of 
punishment on compliance behavior. Faure and Svatikova (2012) and Blondiau et al. (2015) 
compare administrative penalty schemes with criminal schemes.3     
As compared with theoretical and empirical studies, there are fewer experimental studies. 
Using a laboratory experimental approach, Cochard (2005) examined the effect of 
environmental policies (such as input based tax, ambient tax/subsidy, ambient tax, group fine) 
                                                  
2  Heyes (2000) reviewed and examined the issues regarding environmental regulations and 
compliance behavior theoretically. Moreover, Holler (1993) considered a game between a polluter and 
an inspector and examined the case in which the third player intervenes the game. 
3  Gray and Shimshack (2011) reviewed empirical studies regarding environmental regulations. 
Dasgupta et al. (2000) examined the relationship between the type of environmental policy on 
compliance behavior. 
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on compliance behavior. Except for ambient tax/subsidy, these policies are found to be 
effective. Moreover, Germani et al. (2017) introduced a realistic penalty scheme into a 
laboratory experimental design and showed that unpredictable inspection enforcement may 
induce compliance.4 
   Using a laboratory experimental approach, this study examines the effect of institutional 
changes in the responsibility for paying inspection costs on the behavior of polluters and 
authorities.  
   To achieve our goal, we first compare two schemes of inspection cost payments. In our 
experiment, each subject plays either the role of a polluter (a producer) or an authority (an 
inspector). There are two production methods for producers: clean (environmentally friendly) 
and dirty (environmentally unfriendly). Producers have to adopt the clean production method 
to comply with the environmental regulation. However, producers can choose a production 
method in reality differing from that they report to authorities. In other words, producers can 
report use of the clean method but actually use the dirty method. In the first cost payment 
scheme, the authority always bears the inspection cost. In the second scheme, a producer bears 
the inspection cost (i) when the producer uses the dirty method but reports the clean method 
and (ii) when an inspector carries out the inspection. Intuitively, producers have stronger 
incentive to comply with the environmental regulation in the latter than the former scheme, 
because it becomes more costly for them to make a false report.  
   Second, as noted above, social surplus maximizers might not have incentives to conduct 
inspection, punishment, and income redistribution because they are costly. Thus, we introduce 
                                                  
4  Other experimental studies are also related to this study, although they did not focus on 
environmental regulations. For example, Kleven (2011) conducted a type of field experiment and 
observed tax evasion behavior and compared self-reporting income and third party reported income. 
Anderson and Stafford (2003) conducted a public goods game with a punishment scheme and examined 
the effect of severity of punishment on compliance behavior. Moreover, they found a positive 
relationship between punishment in the past and compliance in the present period. Moreover, Ambrus 
and Greiner (2012) conducted a public goods game and examined the effect of costly punishment on 
cooperative behavior. 
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an environmental authority whose objective is to maximize the sum of revenues from polluters, 
fines, and compensation for environmental damage, minus environmental damage and 
inspection costs. Because the producer surplus is not included in this objective function, fines 
and compensation are not mere distribution. Rather, they are positive factors for the 
environmental authority, because it can use the revenue to mitigate environmental damage 
and/or prevent future environmental damage. Many researchers have referred to the objective 
of authorities and/or society. For example, Rousseau (2009) enumerated three important 
possible objectives of regulators: social welfare maximization, deterrence maximization, and 
providing justice. 5  Social welfare maximization is an orthodox objective in the field of 
economics. Deterrence maximization is aimed at minimizing the possibility of violation. 
Providing justice is a more complicated objective than the first two, because there are various 
definitions of justice. Taking into consideration these objectives, the objective of the 
environmental authority in our study is located between welfare maximization and deterrence 
minimization. 
   Third, we investigate whether uncertainty about environmental damage influences the 
behavior of both polluters and authorities. In particular, we adopt an experimental design in 
which an authority cannot know with certainty whether an environmentally friendly or 
unfriendly polluter emits pollution when the authority does not carry out the inspection, 
although the authority can observe the occurrence of the pollution with certainty. 
   The main results are as follows. First, the partial shift of inspection cost payment from 
authorities to polluters induces compliant behavior of polluters. In addition, polluters choose 
their strategies based on the behavior of authorities in the past periods. In particular, the more 
frequently the authorities carry out inspection, the more likely it is that polluters comply with 
the environmental regulation. Second, the partial shift of inspection cost payment from 
                                                  
5 Blondiau and Rousseau (2017) theoretically and empirically examined judge’s objective functions. 
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authorities to polluters does not influence the frequency of carrying out inspections 
significantly. Rather, authorities choose their enforcement strategies based on the inspection 
cost and behavior of polluters in the past periods. As intuitively expected, the higher is the 
inspection cost, the less frequently authorities carry out inspections. In addition, the more 
frequently producers violate the environmental regulation in the past periods, the more likely 
it is that authorities carry out inspections. Third, the shift of responsibility for inspection cost 
from authorities to polluters causes income redistribution between polluters and authorities (or 
pollutees). Because polluters pay more compliance costs when there is a possibility of bearing 
the inspection cost than when authorities always bear the cost, and because the frequency of 
the occurrence of environmental damage decreases owing to the change in the cost allocation 
scheme, the payoff of polluters significantly decreases. However, total payoff (i.e., the sum of 
payoffs of polluters and authorities) increases only slightly and the difference between the two 
cost allocation schemes is not significant. Fourth, when uncertainty about environmental 
damage is introduced, not only the behavior of polluters but also that of authorities is 
influenced by the change in the inspection cost allocation scheme. In particular, the frequency 
of inspection is greater when there is a possibility that polluters bear the inspection cost than 
when authorities always bear the cost. Consequently, the change in the scheme increases both 
payments for compliance and inspection costs and, accordingly, decreases the total payoff on 
average. 
   The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 2 provides the theoretical background, 
and Section 3 explains the basic experimental design. Section 4 reports and discusses the 
results of the experiment in the absence of uncertainty. Section 5 examines the case in the 
presence of uncertainty. Section 6 provides concluding remarks. 
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2. Background  
In this section, we describe the background of the experimental design. The first subsection 
presents the theoretical background regarding the sub-game perfect equilibrium and the 
second subsection refers to a repeated-game setting and also describes the findings of 
laboratory and field experimental studies in the literature.  
 
2.1 One-shot Game between a Firm and an Authority 
Consider a game between one firm and one authority. The firm chooses either G or B 
production method in the presence of an environmental regulation set by the authority. If the 
firm wants to comply with the regulation, it has to choose G. On the contrary, the choice of B 
implies violation of the environmental regulation. For simplicity, we extract from the decision 
making on the production quantity and assume that the firm produces a certain fixed amount 
of products. The production costs for G and B is 𝑐𝑐𝐺𝐺 and 𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵, respectively. It is assumed that 
𝑐𝑐𝐺𝐺 > 𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵.6 Method B emits pollution into the air and/or water, while Method G does not emit 
any pollution. The environmental damage in monetary value is denoted by 𝑒𝑒𝐵𝐵, which is a type 
of social cost. Therefore, if there are no schemes and/or policies to shift the social cost to the 
private cost of the firm, the firm does not (need to) bear the environmental cost. 
   In addition, the firm reports its production method to the authority. The report itself does 
not incur any cost. The reported method can differ from the actual production method. On the 
one hand, the report is public information, which means that the authority can receive the 
report. On the other hand, the actual production method is private information, which implies 
that the authority cannot know with certainty whether the report is true. However, as explained 
below, the authority may inspect the actual production method. In such a case, the actual 
                                                  
6 If 𝑐𝑐𝐺𝐺 ≤ 𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵, the firm has no incentive to violate the regulation. Thus, there is no problem to be solved 
regarding environmental damage and policies. We exclude such a redundant situation by this 
assumption. 
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production method is assumed to be necessarily revealed. 
   If the firm chooses B as the actual production method and reports G, and if the false report 
is revealed, the firm has to pay a fine to the authority, the amount of which is denoted by F. 
The firm may also have to pay compensation for environmental damage, which implies that 
the scheme of environmental regulation and inspection may be able to shift the environmental 
cost from the society to the firm. If the firm chooses B and reports B, it necessarily has to pay 
compensation. However, if the firm chooses B and reports G, it has to pay compensation only 
when the authority carries out the inspection. The compensation value is assumed to be the 
same as the environmental cost. 
The authority chooses whether to carry out the inspection, whose cost is denoted by 𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀. 
Because the compensation and fine are income redistribution, whether they are present does 
not influence social welfare, including the environmental cost. Therefore, the authority has no 
incentive to carry out inspection if its objective is social welfare maximization and if it always 
bears the inspection cost. The reason is that the decision whether to inspect is made after the 
completion of production (and emissions, if there are any). Thus, we consider an 
environmental authority whose objective is explained below. In addition, we consider an 
additional scheme under which the firm bears the inspection cost in a given situation. 
The objective function of the firm (π) is given by 
   π = R −  𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 −  𝜎𝜎𝐵𝐵𝑒𝑒𝐵𝐵 −  𝜎𝜎𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 −  𝜎𝜎𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀,      𝑖𝑖 = 𝐺𝐺,𝐵𝐵,  
where R denotes the sales revenue from production. 𝜎𝜎𝐵𝐵 = 1  when the firm pays 
compensation and 𝜎𝜎𝐵𝐵 = 0 when it does not. 𝜎𝜎𝐹𝐹 = 1 when the firm is fined and 𝜎𝜎𝐹𝐹 = 0 
when it is not. 𝜎𝜎𝑀𝑀 = 1 when the firm bears the inspection cost and 𝜎𝜎𝑀𝑀 = 0 when it does not. 
Moreover, hereafter, we assume that 𝑐𝑐𝐺𝐺 = 0 for simplicity.     
The objective function of the authority (S) is given by S =  𝜎𝜎𝐵𝐵𝑒𝑒𝐵𝐵 +  𝜎𝜎𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 −  𝜏𝜏𝐵𝐵𝑒𝑒𝐵𝐵 − 𝜏𝜏𝑀𝑀 𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀. 
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𝜏𝜏𝐵𝐵 = 1  when the firm chooses B as the actual production method and 𝜏𝜏𝐵𝐵 = 0  when it 
chooses G as the real production method. 𝜏𝜏𝑀𝑀 = 1 when the authority bears the inspection 
cost and 𝜏𝜏𝑀𝑀 = 0 when it does not. Note that when the authority chooses to carry out the 
inspection, 𝜏𝜏𝑀𝑀 + 𝜎𝜎𝑀𝑀 = 1 necessarily holds, and when the authority chooses not to carry out 
the inspection, 𝜏𝜏𝑀𝑀 =  𝜎𝜎𝑀𝑀 = 0 necessarily holds. 
   We consider the following game structure. In the first stage, the firm chooses its actual 
production method and the content of the report, G or M. In the second stage, the authority 
chooses whether to carry out inspection. The game tree is shown in Figure 1. In the figure, for 
clarity, the choices of the firm are disaggregated into two stages: the choice of report and the 
choice of actual production method. In this sense, this game can be recaptured as follows. In 
the first stage, the firm chooses its report content. In the second stage, the firm and the authority 
simultaneously choose the actual production method and whether to carry out the inspection, 
respectively.  
   First, we consider the cost allocation scheme in which the authority always bears the 
inspection cost regardless of the choices of actual production method and report content. The 
payoffs for each combination of choices by both players are shown in Figure 1. From these 
payoffs, we can summarize the strategies regarding the sub-game perfect equilibrium. Suppose 
that the authority always bears the inspection cost. On the one hand, if  CM − F ≥  eB, there 
is a unique sub-game perfect equilibrium in which the firm reports G and chooses B as the 
actual production method and the authority chooses not to carry out inspection. On the other 
hand, if  CM − F <  eB , there might be two sub-game perfect equilibria. One is a pure-
strategy equilibrium in which the producer reports B and chooses G as the actual production 
method and the authority chooses not to carry out inspection. The other is a mixed-strategy 
equilibrium in which the firm reports G with certainty, while it chooses probabilities of 
adopting both actual production methods. The authority also chooses probabilities of 
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inspection and no inspection. 
   Second, we consider the cost allocation scheme in which the firm has to bear the inspection 
cost (i) when it reports G and chooses B as the actual production method and (ii) when the 
authority carries out the inspection. Like the previous allocation scheme, the authority bears 
the inspection cost for other situations. The change in the payoff corresponding to this change 
in cost allocation is indicated by bold-highlighted and red values in Figure 1. From these 
payoffs, we can summarize the strategies for the sub-game perfect equilibrium as follows. 
Suppose that the firm has to bear the inspection cost (i) when it reports G and chooses B as 
the actual production method and (ii) when the authority carries out the inspection. Then, there 
is a unique sub-game perfect equilibrium, which is a mixed-strategy equilibrium in which the 
firm reports G with certainty, while it chooses probabilities for both actual production methods. 
The authority also chooses probabilities of inspection and no inspection. 
 
2.2 Conditional Behavior 
In the real world, as pointed out by Harrington (1988), in spite that inspection and sanction 
probabilities are low, compliant behavior is observed and the probability of compliance seems 
to be relatively high. Harrington (1988) set up a repeated game and considered a scheme in 
which firms are categorized into two groups; that is, the group of well-behaved and ill-
behaved.7 Hereafter in this paper, the former and latter groups are referred to as GW and GI, 
respectively. Precisely, if a firm in GW violates the environmental regulation, it will be 
categorized into GI in the next period. And, if a firm in GI comply with the environmental 
regulation, it will be categorized into GW with a certain probability in the next period. Then, 
the authority sets inspection probabilities for firms of both groups and the probability that a 
compliant firm moves from GI to GW. Under this setting, the theory can explain the 
                                                  
7 As noted in the introduction, Frieson (2003) also examined this type of scheme. 
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probabilities of inspections and compliance in the real world. The important point is that 
because the inspection probability for firms in GW is different from and lower than that for 
firms in GI, the inspection probability for each firm depends on the firm’s behavior in the past 
periods. As described in the introduction, Helland (1998) empirically found that the behavior 
of firms (authorities) depend on the behavior of authorities (firms).  
   Conditional behavior is also often observed in the case of common-pool resource use. For 
example, using laboratory or field experimental approaches, many studies have found that 
there are conditional cooperators regarding the use of common pool resources and the 
contribution for public goods. 8  Resource users or contributors act cooperatively if their 
partners or community members act cooperatively. In this case, the behavior of these resource 
users is determined based on the behavior of other users in the past periods.  
In this respect, similar situations may be observed for compliance with enforcement of 
environmental regulations. For example, firms may have strong incentive to comply with an 
environmental regulation when they do not observe inspections frequently, which may imply 
that firms perceive that authorities are cooperative, in past periods. In addition, authorities may 
have strong incentive to carry out inspections when they observe frequent violation by firms, 
which imply that firms are non—cooperative, in past periods.  
 
3. Experimental Design 
Each experimental session involved four steps. Subjects filled out a questionnaire on risk 
preference and time preference in the first and second steps, respectively. They played a 
compliance-inspection game in the third step, and they filled out a follow-up questionnaire 
about their experience and strategy in the compliance-inspection game in the fourth step. We 
explain the details of each step below. 
                                                  
8 For example, see Rustagi et al. (2010) for the field experimental analysis and Duffy and Lafky (2016) 
and Röttgers (2016) for laboratory experiments among others.  
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3.1 Risk Preference 
The questionnaire about risk preference consisted of 10 questions.9 Subjects selected either 
Choice A or Choice B for each question. For example, the meaning of each choice for Question 
1 is as follows. A lottery will be drawn after subjects finish answering questions: (i) 10 cards 
with a number from 1 through 10 on each card are placed in a bag; then (ii) the experiment’s 
organizer or an assistant will blindly picks one card. When a subject has chosen Choice A, if 
card 1, 2, 3, or 4 is picked, the subject will receive JPY 400, while if card 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, or 10 
is picked, the subject will receive JPY 100. On the other hand, when a subject has chosen 
Choice B, if card 1 is picked, the subject will receive JPY 680, while if card 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 
9, or 10 is picked, the subject will receive JPY 50. Prizes for Choice B differ across questions. 
For all questions, Choice A is less risky than Choice B. Thus, the more risk averse a subject, 
the greater times the subject selects Choice A.  
   In the sessions, subjects were told that only 1 of 10 questions would be chosen for real 
payments although which question is for real payments would be determined by lottery after 
all of the four steps are finished. 
 
3.2 Time Preference 
The questionnaire about time preference consisted of 14 questions.10 Subjects selected either 
Choice A or Choice B for each question, the meaning of which is as follows. On the one hand, 
when a subject selects Choice A, s/he receives a certain amount of money today. On the other 
hand, when a subject selects Choice B, s/he receives a certain amount of money at a certain 
point in the future. For example, in Question 1, when a subject selects Choice A, s/he receives 
JPY 3,000 today, whereas, when a subject selects Choice B, s/he receives JPY 4,000 after 1 
                                                  
9 See Figure 2 for details. 
10 See Table 1 for details. 
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month. The amounts of money and the point in the future differ across questions.  
Different from the questionnaire on risk preference, the questionnaire on time preference 
is hypothetical. Thus, in the sessions, subjects were told that they would not receive real money 
from the questionnaire on time preference.  
 
3.3 Compliance and Inspection Game 
Two subjects were randomly paired at the beginning of the game. Neither subject knew the 
identity of his or her partner during and after the experiment. One of the pair acted as a 
producer and the other as an inspector.11 These roles were fixed throughout the compliance-
inspection game. As described below, pairs were fixed for the first 20 rounds. At the beginning 
of the 21st round, we reshuffled pairs and randomly paired subjects for another fixed period 
from the 21st to 45th rounds. Hereafter, we refer to the first 20 rounds as the first phase and 
the last 25 rounds as the second phase.  
   Each round of the game consisted of three stages. In the first stage, each producer selected 
production method 1 or 2 and message 1 or 2 within 15 seconds. Hereafter, for differentiation 
between production methods and messages, let P1 and P2 denote production methods, and M1 
and M2 denote messages. The message chosen was conveyed to the producer’s partner 
(inspector), while the real production method was private information for the producer. The 
producer could select a different message to the real production method. For example, s/he 
could choose P1 and M2. 
   The producer did not set production amounts; sales from production were 100 regardless 
of production method. When the producer chose P1, s/he had to pay a certain amount of 
production cost.12 However, when the producer chose P2, s/he paid no production cost. P2 
                                                  
11 In the experiment, we adopted more neutral words for representing the two roles: executant and 
surveillant. 
12 Because the production costs differ across treatments, we explain them in Subsection 3.5. 
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was assumed to cause environmental damage to the society around the production point, 
whose monetary value was 40, while P1 caused no environmental damage.  
   When the producer selected P1, s/he did not need to pay any compensation. However, 
when the producer selected P2 and M2, s/he had to pay compensation for the damage 
equivalent to 40. When the producer chose P2 and M1, compensation had to be paid depending 
on the presence of inspection. One the one hand, when the producer’s partner chose to carry 
out the inspection, the producer had to pay compensation. In addition, in this case, the producer 
had to pay a fine equivalent to 10. The existence of a fine means that there was an 
environmental regulation governing the production method. Adoption of production method 1 
implies compliance, while adoption of production method 2 implies violation. On the other 
hand, when the producer’s partner chose not to inspect, s/he paid neither compensation nor a 
fine. 
   In the second stage, each inspector chose whether to carry out inspection or not within 10 
seconds. When the inspector made the choices, s/he was aware of the message sent from 
her/his partner. However, s/he did not know the real production method. Inspection is costly, 
the amount of which depends on treatments. When the producer pays compensation and a fine, 
this becomes the revenue of the inspector. 
The payment of the inspection cost is important for the purpose of this study. In the first 
phase, regardless of the choice of production method and message by producers, the inspection 
cost was always borne by inspectors when they conducted inspection. However, in the second 
phase, when a producer chose P2 and M1, and when the inspector chose to carry out inspection, 
the producer had to pay the inspection cost. When a producer chose P1 or a combination of P2 
and M2, the inspector had to pay the inspection cost, like in the first phase. 
   In the third stage, the results were shown on the screen for 15 seconds. During this stage, 
subjects recorded the results on a piece of paper. 
15 
 
   The producer’s payoff for the first phase (the first 20 rounds) of this game is defined as 
   𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺 − 𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷 𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑺𝑺𝑷𝑷 −  𝑪𝑪𝑷𝑷𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑺𝑺𝑷𝑷𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷 –𝑭𝑭𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑺𝑺. 
Thus, the payoff for each case is calculated as follows. When the producer chose P1, regardless 
of the messages or presence of inspection, her/his payoff was 
   𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺 (𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏) − 𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷 𝑪𝑪𝑷𝑷𝑺𝑺𝑷𝑷 . 
When the producer chose P2 and M1 and inspection was conducted, her/his payoff was 
   𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺 (𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏) − 𝑪𝑪𝑷𝑷𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑺𝑺𝑷𝑷𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷 (𝟒𝟒𝟏𝟏) − 𝑭𝑭𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑺𝑺 (𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏) = 𝟓𝟓𝟏𝟏. 
When the producer chose P2 and M1 and inspection was not conducted, her/his payoff was 
  𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺 (𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏). 
When the producer chose P2 and M2, regardless of whether inspection was conducted, her/his 
payoff was 
   𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺 (𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏) − 𝑪𝑪𝑷𝑷𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑺𝑺𝑷𝑷𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷 (𝟒𝟒𝟏𝟏) = 𝟔𝟔𝟏𝟏. 
The inspector’s payoff for the first phase (the first 20 rounds) of this game is defined as 
   𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏 − 𝑰𝑰𝑷𝑷𝑺𝑺𝑪𝑪𝑺𝑺𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷 𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑺𝑺𝑷𝑷 − 𝑬𝑬𝑷𝑷𝑬𝑬𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑪𝑪𝑺𝑺𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺 𝑷𝑷𝑺𝑺𝑪𝑪𝑺𝑺𝒅𝒅𝑺𝑺 +  𝑪𝑪𝑷𝑷𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑺𝑺𝑷𝑷𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷 +
𝑭𝑭𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑺𝑺. 
To avoid the occurrence of negative total payoff, we introduce positive fixed revenue (the first 
term in the definition of the inspector above). Thus, the payoff for each case is calculated as 
follows. When the partner chose P1, and the inspector chose to inspect, regardless of messages, 
her/his payoff was 
  𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏 − 𝑰𝑰𝑷𝑷𝑺𝑺𝑪𝑪𝑺𝑺𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷 𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑺𝑺𝑷𝑷. 
When the partner chose P1, and the inspector chose not to inspect, regardless of messages, 
her/his payoff equaled 𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏. When the partner chose P2 and M1, and the inspector chose to 
inspect, her/his payoff was 
   𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏 – 𝑰𝑰𝑷𝑷𝑺𝑺𝑪𝑪𝑺𝑺𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷 𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑺𝑺𝑷𝑷 − 𝑬𝑬𝑷𝑷𝑬𝑬𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑪𝑪𝑺𝑺𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺 𝑷𝑷𝑺𝑺𝑪𝑪𝑺𝑺𝒅𝒅𝑺𝑺 (𝟒𝟒𝟏𝟏)     + 𝑪𝑪𝑷𝑷𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑺𝑺𝑷𝑷𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷 (𝟒𝟒𝟏𝟏) + 𝑭𝑭𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑺𝑺(𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏). 
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When the partner chose P2 and M1, and the inspector chose not to inspect, her/his payoff was 
   𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏 𝑬𝑬𝑷𝑷𝑬𝑬𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑪𝑪𝑺𝑺𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺 𝑷𝑷𝑺𝑺𝑪𝑪𝑺𝑺𝒅𝒅𝑺𝑺 (𝟒𝟒𝟏𝟏). 
When the partner chose P2 and M2, and the inspector chose to inspect, her/his payoff was 
  𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏 – 𝑰𝑰𝑷𝑷𝑺𝑺𝑪𝑪𝑺𝑺𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷 𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑺𝑺𝑷𝑷 − 𝑬𝑬𝑷𝑷𝑬𝑬𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑪𝑪𝑺𝑺𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺 𝑷𝑷𝑺𝑺𝑪𝑪𝑺𝑺𝒅𝒅𝑺𝑺 (𝟒𝟒𝟏𝟏)     + 𝑪𝑪𝑷𝑷𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑺𝑺𝑷𝑷𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷 (𝟒𝟒𝟏𝟏). 
When the partner chose P2 and M2, and the inspector chose not to inspect, her/his payoff was 
  𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏 𝑬𝑬𝑷𝑷𝑬𝑬𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑪𝑪𝑺𝑺𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺 𝑷𝑷𝑺𝑺𝑪𝑪𝑺𝑺𝒅𝒅𝑺𝑺 (𝟒𝟒𝟏𝟏)  +  𝑪𝑪𝑷𝑷𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑺𝑺𝑷𝑷𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷 (𝟒𝟒𝟏𝟏). 
   The payoffs in the second phase were the same as those for the first phase when a producer 
chose P1 or a combination of P2 and M2. However, when a producer chose P2 and M1, the 
payoffs of both producers and inspectors differed in the first and second phases. As the 
inspection cost was borne by the producer in this case, we redefine the producer’s payoff as 
   𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺 –𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷 𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑺𝑺𝑷𝑷 −  𝑪𝑪𝑷𝑷𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑺𝑺𝑷𝑷𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷 –𝑭𝑭𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑺𝑺 − 𝑰𝑰𝑷𝑷𝑺𝑺𝑪𝑪𝑺𝑺𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷 𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑺𝑺𝑷𝑷. 
However, because the production cost for P1 is zero, the payoff of a producer for this case is 
rewritten as 
   𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺 −  𝑪𝑪𝑷𝑷𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑺𝑺𝑷𝑷𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷 (𝟒𝟒𝟏𝟏)–𝑭𝑭𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑺𝑺 (𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏) − 𝑰𝑰𝑷𝑷𝑺𝑺𝑪𝑪𝑺𝑺𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷 𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑺𝑺𝑷𝑷. 
The payoff of an inspector for this case is rewritten as 
   𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏 − 𝑬𝑬𝑷𝑷𝑬𝑬𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑪𝑪𝑺𝑺𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺 𝑷𝑷𝑺𝑺𝑪𝑪𝑺𝑺𝒅𝒅𝑺𝑺 (𝟒𝟒𝟏𝟏)  +  𝑪𝑪𝑷𝑷𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑺𝑺𝑷𝑷𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷 (𝟒𝟒𝟏𝟏) + 𝑭𝑭𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑺𝑺(𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏). 
 
3.4 Follow-up Questionnaire 
After the compliance-inspection game, subjects answered a follow-up questionnaire that 
consisted of two simple questions. The first question asked subjects about the experience of 
participating in laboratory experiments, and the second question asked them about their 
adopted strategies. The latter was not a multiple-choice question and subjects could write any 
answers. 
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3.5 Treatments 
We adopt three treatments for the experiment on the compliance-inspection game.13 As noted 
in Subsection 3.3, there is one common feature for all treatments: When the producer of a pair 
chooses P2 and M1 and when the inspector of the pair chooses to carry out inspection, the 
inspection cost is borne by the inspector in the first phase and by the producer in the second 
phase. The main purpose of this study is to investigate the effect of changing responsibility for 
inspection cost payment, which is captured by the difference between the two phases.  
   The difference between the treatments is the amount of compliance and inspection costs. 
The former cost is the production cost that producers have to pay when they choose P1. In the 
LH treatment, the compliance cost is 15 and the inspection cost is 60. In the HH treatment, the 
compliance cost is 30 and the inspection cost is 60. Moreover, in the LL treatment, the 
corresponding values are 15 and 30, respectively.  
   In terms of the sub-game perfect equilibrium strategies, the LH and HH treatments are 
similar. In the first phase, producers choose P2 and M1 and inspectors choose not to carry out 
inspection. In this case, the dominant strategy for inspectors is no inspection. Taking into 
consideration the behavior of inspectors, producers choose to violate the environmental 
regulation, that is, they choose environmentally unfriendly production method, P2. On the 
other hand, in the second phase, if the producer of a pair chooses P2 and M1, the payoff for 
the inspector of the pair is larger when s/he chooses to carry out inspection than not to carry 
out. Thus, there is no dominant strategy for inspectors in the second phase. There is a mixed 
strategy equilibrium. The probability of compliance is 50/110 for both the LH and HH 
treatments, and the probabilities of inspection are 15/110 for the LH treatment and 30/110 for 
the HH treatment.  
                                                  
13 We also adopted an additional treatment with uncertainty (see Section 5 for details). 
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In the case of the LL treatment, there are two possible equilibria. One is the equilibrium in 
which producers choose P1 and M2 and inspectors choose no inspection. There is also a 
mixed-strategy equilibrium because there is no dominant strategy for an inspector when 
her/his partner chooses M1. However, there is dominant strategy for an inspector, no 
inspection, when her/his partner chooses M2. The expected payoff of a producer when s/he 
chooses M1 and the payoff of a producer when s/he chooses P1 and M2 are the same. Thus, 
when an inspector observes M2, s/he understands that her/his partner chooses P1 as the real 
production method. The equilibrium situation for the LL treatment in the second phase is 
similar to that for the other two treatments. The probability of compliance is 50/80 and the 
probability of inspection is 15/80. 
 
3.6 Sessions and Procedure 
We conducted four, two, and two sessions for the HL, HH, and LL treatments, respectively. 
There were 10 participants in each session, implying that there were five pairs in each session. 
The subjects were undergraduate students of Kwansei Gakuin University. See Table 2 for the 
details of the sessions. Although we did not exclude students from any specific departments, 
the participants were mainly students of the School of Economics. Other students were from 
the fields of business, law, and literature, among others, although their ratios were small. Each 
student participated in only one session. Each subject received JPY 1,000 as a fixed 
participation award. The payoff from the questionnaire on risk preference and from the 
compliance-inspection game (the payoff of the compliance-inspection game times 0.6) were 
added. Thus, on average, students were paid JPY 3074.59 based on their results.14 
   At the beginning of each session, the subjects signed a consent form after listening to 
general instructions. Then, they answered the questionnaire on risk preference. At the 
                                                  
14 The minimum, maximum, and standard deviation were 2,600, 3,800, and 190.331, respectively. 
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beginning of the compliance-inspection game, subjects read the instructions for about 10 
minutes. Then, before starting the game, for a more precise understanding of the instructions, 
an instructor read them out aloud.  
   In the first stage of the compliance-inspection game, producers inputted 1 or 2 for both the 
production method and messages. Because both producers and inspectors listened to an 
instructor reading the instruction aloud, we adopted different numbers for inspectors to avoid 
confusion: inspectors inputted 3 when choosing to carry out an inspection and 4 when they did 
not.  
In this study, we use technical terms specific to environmental economics. However, in the 
experiment, the subjects were shown more neutral terminology. We conducted the experiment 
using the University of Zurich’s A-tree program (Fischbacher, 2007). 
 
4. Methods and Results 
4.1 Basic Results 
We begin with the behavior of producers. Figure 3 shows the frequencies of the combinations 
of the production method and message in both phases. The result of the LH treatment (Figures 
3 (a) and (b)) reveals that the ratio of the combination of P1 and M1 is larger and that of P2 
and M1 is smaller in the second phase than in the first phase. This fact implies that the partial 
shift of inspection cost payment from the inspector to the producer induces the compliance 
behavior of producers. Because the violation and the creation of a false report become more 
costly in the second phase than in the first phase, the producers are considered to respond to 
an increase in the cost of violation rationally.  
The change in the ratios of the frequencies is clearer for the HH treatment than for the LH 
treatment (Figures 3 (c) and (d)). Because the compliance cost is higher in the former than in 
the latter treatment, the incentive to violate the environmental regulation in the first phase is 
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stronger in the former than the latter treatment. The difference in the incentive for violation is 
reflected in Figures 3 (a) and (c). The shift of the inspection cost when the producer chooses 
P2 and M1 clearly reduces the incentive for violating the environmental regulation.  
When it comes to the LL treatment, the result is unclear: that is, the ratios of the frequency 
of violation in both phases do not seem to be different (Figures 3 (e) and (f)). The possible 
reasons are as follows. First, because the compliance cost is low, the incentive for violation is 
relatively weak even in the first phase. Second, because the inspection cost is low, the effect 
of the change in the cost allocation is also relatively small. 
   Let us now turn to the behavior of inspectors. Figures 4 (a), (b), and (c) show the results 
of the ratios of carrying out inspection for the LH, HH, and LL treatments, respectively. 
Contrary to the behavioral change of producers, there is no difference in the ratios between 
the first and second phases for all of the three treatments.  
   The results of the behavior of both producers and inspectors reveal that their choices are 
different from those in the sub-game perfect equilibrium. Producers are supposed to always 
choose P2 and M1 in the first phase for the LH and HH treatments if they follow the strategy 
in the sub-game perfect equilibrium. Although the direction of the change in the choices of 
producers is the same, the choices in particular in the first phase are clearly different from 
those in the sub-game perfect equilibrium. We investigate their behavior in more detail in the 
next subsection. 
  We verify the difference of the choices between the first and second phases by conducting 
Welch’s t-test. The results are shown in Table 3. As noted above, the partial shift of the 
inspection cost payment induces an increase in the choice of P1 and M1 for the LH and HH 
treatments, while the change is not significant for the LL treatment. Moreover, with regard to 
the ratio of the frequency, the behavior of inspectors is not influenced by the change in the 
responsibility for bearing the inspection cost.  
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   Finally, we focus on the effect of the change in the inspection cost allocation on payoffs of 
both producers and inspectors. According to Table 3, the payoffs of producers are significantly 
smaller in the first than second phase, while those of inspectors are significantly larger in the 
first than in second phase. This result is natural because compliance, which is the adoption of 
production method 1, is costly, and an increase in the frequency of compliance leads to a 
decrease in environmental damage. Meanwhile, it is interesting that the difference in the total 
payoff is not significant between the two phases. In fact, the average total payoff increases 
slightly after the change in the responsibility for paying inspection costs for all three treatments. 
However, the effect of an increase in the compliance cost payment neutralizes the effect of a 
decrease in the social cost payment (environmental damage). Nevertheless, it is clear that the 
institutional change in the inspection cost allocation leads to the income redistribution.  
 
4.2 Investigation of Conditional Behavior 
As described in the previous subsection, the strategies of producers and inspectors are different 
from those in the sub-game perfect equilibrium. Thus, we next examine if their choices depend 
on their own choices and/or their partners in the previous periods.  
   First, focusing on the behavior of producers, we estimate the following equation: 
  𝑽𝑽𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝒋𝒋,𝑷𝑷,𝒅𝒅 = 𝑷𝑷 + 𝜷𝜷𝟏𝟏 ∙ 𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑺𝑺𝒓𝒓𝒋𝒋 + 𝜷𝜷𝟐𝟐 ∙ 𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑪𝑪𝑺𝑺𝒋𝒋 + 𝜷𝜷𝟑𝟑 ∙ 𝒉𝒉𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝒉𝒉 + 𝜷𝜷𝟒𝟒 ∙ 𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑺𝑺𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷,𝒅𝒅  
                + 𝜷𝜷𝟓𝟓 ∙ 𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑺𝑺𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷,𝒅𝒅+𝜷𝜷𝟔𝟔 ∙ 𝑪𝑪𝑺𝑺𝑷𝑷𝒉𝒉𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝟒𝟒𝒋𝒋,𝑷𝑷,𝒅𝒅 + 𝜷𝜷𝟕𝟕 ∙ 𝑺𝑺𝑷𝑷𝒉𝒉𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑺𝑺𝑪𝑪𝑺𝑺𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝟒𝟒𝒓𝒓,𝑷𝑷,𝒅𝒅 
                +𝜷𝜷𝟖𝟖 ∙ 𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝒅𝒅𝒉𝒉𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑺𝑺𝒋𝒋,𝑷𝑷,𝒅𝒅 + 𝜺𝜺 
where subscripts j, k, t, and g denote index for individual producer, individual inspector, rounds, 
and sessions, respectively. The dependent variable is a dummy variable that takes 1 when a 
producer chooses P2 and 0 when a producer chooses P1. We adopt a panel probit estimation 
for the analysis.  
We adopt eight independent variables. 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑘𝑘𝑗𝑗 is the degree of risk aversion of subject j. As 
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explained in Subsection 3.1, the more risk averse a subject, the more times the subject selects 
Choice A. Moreover, the questionnaire is designed so that each subject switch her/his answer 
only once from Choice A to Choice B. However, some subjects switched more than once not 
only from Choice A to Choice B but also from Choice B to Choice A. This time, we adopt the 
first switching point as representing the degree of risk averting, and this variable is the number 
of times Choice A is made before the first switching point. 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑗𝑗  represents the time 
preference of subject j. This time, we use eight questions (Q7–Q14), and we observe no 
multiple switching of choices. This variable is the number of times Choice A is made; the 
larger this variable is, the more myopic the subject is. half is a dummy variable that takes 1 for 
the rounds in the second phase and 0 for the rounds in the first phase. The coefficient of this 
variable is expected to be negative because the institutional change in the inspection cost 
allocation when choosing P2 and M1 increase the cost of violating and making a false report 
for producers. 𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡,𝑔𝑔  and 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡,𝑔𝑔  are the inspection cost and compliance cost, 
respectively, in round t. The coefficient of 𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡,𝑔𝑔 may be negative, because an increase in 
the inspection cost increases the cost of violation for producers in the second phase. Moreover, 
the coefficient of 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡,𝑔𝑔 is expected to be positive, because an increase in the compliance 
cost increases the incentive of producers to violate the regulation. 𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜4𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡,𝑔𝑔  is the 
average number of times that subject j chooses P2 in the past 4 periods from t-4 through t-1. 
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡4𝑘𝑘,𝑡𝑡,𝑔𝑔 is the average number times that the partner of subject j chooses to carry 
out inspection in the past 4 periods. This variable is considered to represent the attitude of the 
partner toward enforcement of the environmental regulation. Thus, the coefficient of this 
variable is expected to be negative. 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡,𝑔𝑔 is a dummy variable that takes 1 if subject j 
was fined in the previous period and 0 if subject j was not. The coefficient of this variable may 
be positive or negative. On the one hand, if producers consider that their partners carry out 
inspection with certain probabilities, the coefficient can be positive. On the other hand, the 
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experience of being fined may have a similar effect to the effect of 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡4𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡,𝑔𝑔. In 
such a case, the coefficient is negative. 
   The results are shown in Table 4. As verified by the t-test, producers are more likely to 
comply with the regulation in the second than first phase. In addition, we obtain an interesting 
result about their responses to the behavior of their partners in past periods. The coefficient of 
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡4𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡,𝑔𝑔 is negative, as expected, which implies that producers revise their beliefs 
on the attitude of their partners toward enforcing the environmental regulation. Meanwhile, 
the coefficient of 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡,𝑔𝑔 is positive. Producers may not expect their partners to carry 
out the inspection when the partners did so successfully with punishment in the previous 
period. In summary, it is clear that producers determine their choice of production method and 
message based on their partners’ behavior in past periods. 
   Second, focusing on the behavior of inspectors, we estimate the following equation: 
𝑬𝑬𝑷𝑷𝒉𝒉𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑺𝑺𝑪𝑪𝑺𝑺𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝒓𝒓,𝑷𝑷,𝒅𝒅 = 𝑷𝑷 + 𝜷𝜷𝟏𝟏 ∙ 𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑺𝑺𝒓𝒓𝒓𝒓 + 𝜷𝜷𝟐𝟐 ∙ 𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑪𝑪𝑺𝑺𝒓𝒓 + 𝜷𝜷𝟑𝟑 ∙ 𝒉𝒉𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝒉𝒉 + 𝜷𝜷𝟒𝟒 ∙ 𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑺𝑺𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷,𝒅𝒅  
                      + 𝜷𝜷𝟓𝟓 ∙ 𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑺𝑺𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷,𝒅𝒅 + 𝜷𝜷𝟔𝟔 ∙ 𝑪𝑪𝑺𝑺𝑷𝑷𝒉𝒉𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝟒𝟒𝒋𝒋,𝑷𝑷,𝒅𝒅 + 𝜺𝜺 
The dependent variable is a dummy variable that takes 1 when an inspector chooses to carry 
out the inspection and 0 when not. Similar to the analysis for producers, we adopt a panel 
probit estimation for the analysis.   
The signs of the coefficients of the two independent variables are expected to be different 
from those for the producers’ estimation equation. The coefficient of half is considered positive 
because the change in the responsibility for paying the inspection cost reduces the inspectors’ 
expected inspection cost. The coefficient of 𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜4𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡,𝑔𝑔  is expected to be positive if 
inspectors revise their belief according to the behavior of their partners in the past periods. 
The larger is this variable, the more likely it is that their partners violate the environmental 
regulation. Therefore, inspectors are likely to choose to carry out inspection more frequently.  
  The results are shown in Table 5. 𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡,𝑔𝑔  and  𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜4𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡,𝑔𝑔  influence the decision 
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making of inspectors to carry out the inspection significantly. The signs of these two variables 
are the same as expected. The important point is that inspectors as well as producers respond 
to the behavior of their partners’ behavior in the past periods.  
  
5. Uncertainty on Environmental Damage 
As mentioned in the introduction, there are several difficulties for authorities to carry out 
inspections perfectly regarding environmental regulations. We have so far focused on the 
incentive of authorities, because they are often reluctant to carry out costly inspections. In this 
section, we introduce one additional difficulty, which is uncertainty. In particular, we consider 
uncertainty about verification of the source of pollution by assuming there is a possibility of 
occurrence of environmental damage with not only environmental unfriendly but also 
environmentally friendly production method. When an authority observes environmental 
degradation, it cannot verify whether the degradation is caused by a producer that adopt 
environmentally friendly or unfriendly production method unless it carries out the inspection. 
   The basic design of the treatment with uncertainty, which we hereafter refer to as the ULH 
treatment, is the same as those in the other treatments. The compliance and inspection costs 
are the same as the LH treatment: the former cost is 15, and the latter cost is 60. Uncertainty 
is introduced as follows. On the one hand, when a producer chooses P1, the probability of the 
occurrence of environmental damage is 0.2. On the other hand, when a producer chooses P2, 
the probability of the occurrence of environmental damage is 0.8. If an inspector carries out 
the inspection, s/he can verify the actual production method with certainty. However, if an 
inspector does not carry out the inspection, s/he cannot verify the actual production method 
with certainty. Even in the result showing screen, they can know only the occurrence of 
environmental damage. 
   The compensation and fine schemes are as follows. On the one hand, when an inspector 
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carries out the inspection, a producer has to make compensation based on its actual production 
method and the occurrence of environmental damage. If the producer chooses P2 and 
environmental damage arises, it has to make compensation. In addition, regardless of the 
occurrence of environmental damage, if a producer chooses P2 and M1 and if an inspector 
carries out the inspection, the producer is fined. On the other hand, when an inspector does not 
carry out the inspection, a producer has to make compensation based on its report and the 
occurrence of environmental damage. Regardless of the actual production method, if the 
producer chooses M2 and if environmental damage is observed, the producer has to make 
compensation.  
   Similar to the LH and HH treatments, there is a unique sub-game perfect equilibrium in 
the first phase: a producer chooses P2 and M1, and an inspector chooses not to carry out the 
inspection. Moreover, there is a unique sub-game perfect equilibrium in the second phase: both 
a producer and an inspector adopt mixed strategies.  
   The choices of both producers and inspectors in the two phases are shown in Figure 5, and 
the result of the Welch’s t-test are shown in Table 6. Similar to the case in the absence of 
uncertainty, the behavior of producers changes from the first to the second phase. The partial 
shift of inspection cost payment reduces the incentive of producers to adopt environmentally 
unfriendly production method. However, although the frequencies in both phases differ 
significantly, the graph indicates that relatively large number of producers stick to the 
combination of P2 and M1 even in the second phase. Uncertainty is considered to give rise to 
this situation in the second phase. The possible reason is as follows. As explained below, the 
frequency of inspection is lower in the ULH than in the other treatments. Observing this 
situation, producers have incentive to increase their payoff by making a false report.  
   When we observe the behavior of inspectors, there are two clear differences between the 
choices in the absence and presence of uncertainty (see also Figure 4). First, the frequencies 
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of inspections in both phases are likely to be lower in the presence than in the absence of 
uncertainty. There are two possible reasons: one is that the probability of the occurrence of 
environmental damage is lower in the ULH than the other three treatments when producers 
adopt the environmentally unfriendly production method (P2). Thus, an authority may carry 
out inspections less frequently with than without uncertainty. The other is that even when 
producers choose P2 and are inspected, they may not have to make compensation because 
environmental damage may not be generated. Thus, authorities may perceive that inspections 
are not effective very much when uncertainty is present in terms of revenue gains. Second, the 
frequency of inspection increases after the change in the responsibility for the inspection cost 
payment from inspectors to producers. The result of t-test also indicates this change in 
inspectors’ behavior.  
   The changes in the payoffs are also interesting. Similar to the case in the absence of 
uncertainty, the payoffs of producers decrease form the first to the second phase on average. 
This change takes place because of an increase in the payment of the compliance cost. 
However, the payoffs of inspectors do not increase by the scheme change when uncertainty is 
present. Although the frequency of compliance by producers increases, the inspection cost 
payment increases. The former is a positive effect, and the latter is a negative effect in terms 
of the objective of inspectors. Both effects are considered to cancel out each other. 
Consequently, the total payoff decreases by the change in the responsibility for the inspection 
cost payment.  
 
6. Conclusion 
Using a laboratory experimental approach, this study examined the effect of institutional 
change of the way of payment of inspection costs on the behavior of polluters and authorities.  
We found that regardless of the existence of uncertainty, the way of bearing the inspection 
27 
 
cost influences the behavior of polluters. However, the degree of the influence may be smaller 
in the presence than in the absence of uncertainty. Contrary to the behavior of producers, the 
behavior of inspectors does not change significantly when uncertainty is absent, while the 
frequency of inspections is smaller when uncertainty is present than when it is absent.  
The way of inspection cost payment also influences the payoffs of producers and 
inspectors and, accordingly, the total payoff. In terms of violation deterrence, it is clear that 
the partial shift of inspection cost payment works effectively because compliance behavior is 
induced. However, it does not necessarily mean welfare increase. This result implies that even 
if a certain institutional change works effectively for one objective, it may not be desirable in 
terms of other objectives. We added an additional evidence that the authority and the society 
should take into consideration their objectives when designing environmental regulations and 
punishment schemes. 
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Table 1. Choice List on Time Preference 
 
 
 
  
 Choice A Choice B 
Q1 JPY 3,000 today JPY 4,000 one month later 
Q2 JPY 3,000 today JPY 5,000 one month later 
Q3 JPY 3,000 today JPY 6,000 one month later 
Q4 JPY 3,000 today JPY 4,000 seven month later 
Q5 JPY 3,000 today JPY 5,000 seven month later 
Q6 JPY 3,000 today JPY 6,000 seven month later 
Q7 JPY 4,000 today JPY 4,000 two weeks later 
Q8 JPY 4,000 today JPY 4,040 two weeks later 
Q9 JPY 4,000 today JPY 4,080 two weeks later 
Q10 JPY 4,000 today JPY 4,200 two weeks later 
Q11 JPY 4,000 today JPY 4,400 two weeks later 
Q12 JPY 4,000 today JPY 5,600 two weeks later 
Q13 JPY 4,000 today JPY 6,800 two weeks later 
Q14 JPY 4,000 today JPY 8,000 two weeks later 
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   Table 2. Session List 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Session ID Date Treatment Number of Subjects 
1 Dec 19, 2018 LH 10 
2 Dec 19, 2018 LH 10 
3 Dec 20, 2018 LH 10 
4 Dec 20, 2018 HH 10 
5 Dec 20, 2018 HH 10 
6 Dec 21, 2018 LL 10 
7 Dec 21, 2018 LL 10 
8 Dec 21, 2018 LH 10 
9 Jan 9, 2019 ULH 8 
10 Jan 9, 2019 ULH 10 
11 Jan 9, 2019 ULH 8 
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               Table 3. The result of T-test 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Positive t-value for compliance/inspection means that frequency is larger in the second 
term (R21-45) than the first term (R1-20). Positive t-value for payoffs means that the average 
is larger in the second term (R21-45) than in the first term (R1-20).  
*Significant at 10% level, **Significant at 5 %, ***Significant at 1% level. 
 
  
Treatment Variable T-Value (One-sided) 
Ucost60_Ccost15 
Compliance 3.469*** 
Inspection 0.659      
Payoff Producer -3.983*** 
Payoff Authority 4.880*** 
Payoff Total 0.814      
Ucost60_Ccost30 
Compliance 6.690*** 
Inspection -0.137      
Payoff Producer -3.370*** 
Payoff Authority 4.192*** 
Payoff Total 1.269      
Ucost30_Ccost15 
Compliance 0.503      
Inspection -0.338     
Payoff Producer -1.700**   
Payoff Authority 2.650*** 
Payoff Total 0.581      
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                 Table 4. Estimation Result for Producers  
 
Dependent Variable 
Method 2 
(Violation) 
Method 2 
(Violation) 
Method 2 
(Violation) 
risk -0.021 -0.025 -0.025 
  (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) 
time -0.023 -0.022 -0.023 
  (0.037) (0.037) (0.038) 
half -0.378*** -0.410*** -0.412*** 
  (0.062) (0.073) (0.073) 
i-cost 0.002 -0.004 -0.004 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
c-cost 0.002 -0.002 -0.001 
  (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
method4  0.354** 0.209 
   (0.149) (0.158) 
enforcement4  -0.714*** -0.817*** 
   (0.140) (0.145) 
lagfine   0.311*** 
    (0.110) 
cons 0.026 0.142 0.327 
  (0.381) (0.458) (0.468) 
Observations 1800 1480 1480 
ρ 0.112 0.105 0.110 
Log Likelihood -1150.195 -928.229 -924.229 
LR chi2 38.23 79.50 87.50 
Chibar2 60.43 25.78 27.18 
Note: *Significant at 10% level, **Significant at 5 %, ***Significant at 1% level.  
Values in parentheses are standard errors. 
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           Table 5. Estimation Result for Inspectors  
 
Dependent Variable Enforcement Enforcement 
risk -0.003 -0.010 
  (0.018) (0.019) 
time -0.010 -0.019 
  (0.022) (0.023) 
half 0.012 0.091 
  (0.063) (0.073) 
i-cost -0.018*** -0.019*** 
  (0.004) (0.003) 
c-cost 0.009 0.006 
  (0.007) (0.007) 
method4  0.839*** 
   (0.130) 
cons 0.322 -0.701** 
  (0.248) (0.307) 
Observations 1800 1480 
ρ 0.039 0.026 
Log Likelihood -1099.327 -889.553 
LR chi2 18.25 56.87 
Chibar2 10.43 3.51 
 
Note: *Significant at 10% level, **Significant at 5 %, ***Significant at 1% level.  
Values in parentheses are standard errors. 
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             Table 6. The result of t-test (Uncertainty) 
 
Treatment Variable T-Value (One-sided) 
Uncertain (U60_C15) 
Compliance 1.934**   
Inspection 2.183**   
Payoff Producer -4.827*** 
Payoff Authority -0.051      
Payoff Total -4.043*** 
 
Notes: Positive t-value for compliance/inspection means that frequency is larger in the second 
term (R21-45) than the first term (R1-20). Positive t-value for payoffs means that the average 
is larger in the second term (R21-45) than in the first term (R1-20).  
*Significant at 10% level, **Significant at 5 %, ***Significant at 1% level. 
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Figure 1. Game Tree and Payoffs 
 
MG: Report of method G (environmentally friendly method). 
MB: Report of method B (environmentally unfriendly method). 
PG: Choice of G as the actual production method. 
PB: Choice of B as the actual production method. 
I: Choice of inspection. 
NI: Choice of no inspection. 
 
  Polluter's Payoff Authority's Payoff 
①  R −  𝑐𝑐𝐺𝐺 ,  − 𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀 
②  R −  𝑐𝑐𝐺𝐺   0  
③ 
 𝐑𝐑 −  𝑷𝑷𝑩𝑩 − 𝑺𝑺𝑩𝑩 − 𝑭𝑭 
(𝐑𝐑 −  𝑷𝑷𝑩𝑩 − 𝑺𝑺𝑩𝑩 − 𝑭𝑭 − 𝑪𝑪𝑴𝑴)   𝑭𝑭 −  𝑪𝑪𝑴𝑴 (𝑭𝑭) 
④  R −  𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵  −𝑒𝑒𝐵𝐵 
⑤  R −  𝑐𝑐𝐺𝐺   − 𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀 
⑥  R −  𝑐𝑐𝐺𝐺   0 
⑦  R −  𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵 −  𝑒𝑒𝐵𝐵  − 𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀 
⑧  R −  𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵 − 𝑒𝑒𝐵𝐵  0 
 
* The payoffs written in bold-faced type and black are those only for the case in which the 
authority always bears the inspection cost. The payoffs written in bold-faced type and red are 
those only for the case in which the polluter bears the inspection cost under a certain 
condition. 
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Figure 2 The List of Questions for Risk Preference 
  Choice A Choice B 
  Card Prize Card Prize 
1 ①、②、③ JPY 400 ① JPY 680 
  ④、⑤、⑥、⑦、⑧、⑨、⑩ JPY 100 ②、③、④、⑤、⑥、⑦、⑧、⑨、⑩ JPY 50 
     
  Choice A Choice B 
  Card Prize Card Prize 
2 ①、②、③ JPY 400 ① JPY 750 
  ④、⑤、⑥、⑦、⑧、⑨、⑩ JPY 100 ②、③、④、⑤、⑥、⑦、⑧、⑨、⑩ JPY 50 
     
  Choice A Choice B 
  Card Prize Card Prize 
3 ①、②、③ JPY 400 ① JPY 830 
  ④、⑤、⑥、⑦、⑧、⑨、⑩ JPY 100 ②、③、④、⑤、⑥、⑦、⑧、⑨、⑩ JPY 50 
     
  Choice A Choice B 
  Card Prize Card Prize 
4 ①、②、③ JPY 400 ① JPY 930 
  ④、⑤、⑥、⑦、⑧、⑨、⑩ JPY 100 ②、③、④、⑤、⑥、⑦、⑧、⑨、⑩ JPY 50 
     
  Choice A Choice B 
  Card Prize Card Prize 
5 ①、②、③ JPY 400 ① JPY 1060 
  ④、⑤、⑥、⑦、⑧、⑨、⑩ JPY 100 ②、③、④、⑤、⑥、⑦、⑧、⑨、⑩ JPY 50 
     
  Choice A Choice B 
  Card Prize Card Prize 
6 ①、②、③ JPY 400 ① JPY 1250 
  ④、⑤、⑥、⑦、⑧、⑨、⑩ JPY 100 ②、③、④、⑤、⑥、⑦、⑧、⑨、⑩ JPY 50 
     
  Choice A Choice B 
  Card Prize Card Prize 
7 ①、②、③ JPY 400 ① JPY 1500 
  ④、⑤、⑥、⑦、⑧、⑨、⑩ JPY 100 ②、③、④、⑤、⑥、⑦、⑧、⑨、⑩ JPY 50 
     
  Choice A Choice B 
  Card Prize Card Prize 
8 ①、②、③ JPY 400 ① JPY 1850 
  ④、⑤、⑥、⑦、⑧、⑨、⑩ JPY 100 ②、③、④、⑤、⑥、⑦、⑧、⑨、⑩ JPY 50 
     
  Choice A Choice B 
  Card Prize Card Prize 
9 ①、②、③ JPY 400 ① JPY 2200 
  ④、⑤、⑥、⑦、⑧、⑨、⑩ JPY 100 ②、③、④、⑤、⑥、⑦、⑧、⑨、⑩ JPY 50 
     
  Choice A Choice B 
  Card Prize Card Prize 
10 ①、②、③ JPY 400 ① JPY 3000 
  ④、⑤、⑥、⑦、⑧、⑨、⑩ JPY 100 ②、③、④、⑤、⑥、⑦、⑧、⑨、⑩ JPY 50 
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                 Figure 3. Choices of Producers (Frequencies) 
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              Figure 4. Choices of Inspectors (Ratios) 
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           Figure 5. Choices of Producers and Inspectors in ULH Treatment 
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